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Abstract
We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-
reducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two direc-
tions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and inde-
pendent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of
a unique stable steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point. Fi-
nally, we show that the monopolist undersupplies product quality as
compared to the social optimum, while its investment in the abate-
ment of marginal cost is socially e¢ cient.
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1 Introduction
The impact of monopoly power on product quality is a vexata quaestio in the
theory of industrial organization, at least since [21] and [24], where the main
issue under investigation is the rms tendency to distort quality downwards
to extract as much surplus as possible from consumerspockets. This aspect
has been largely debated (see [2], [3], [10], [15], [18], [20]). This literature,
however, (i) is based on static models, and therefore by construction falls
short of characterising the inherently dynamic nature of quality improve-
ment; (ii) leaves out of the picture any other form of investments, such as
any e¤ort directed at decreasing marginal production costs, and nally (iii)
disregards advertising activities (either persuasive or informative) aimed at
increasing demand or making the product more appealing to consumers and
thus convince them to pay higher prices for it.
Here, we propose a model addressing aspects (i) and (ii), leaving aside
(iii), which has generated a lively debate since the late 1970s, stemming from
the pioneering contribution in [11]. The bulk of the resulting literature is
summarised in [8]; for a later contribution in this vein, see [4]. We charac-
terise the optimal R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing
and quality improving activities under full market coverage, and selling its
product to a population of consumers endowed with di¤erent levels of will-
ingness to pay for quality. Our results can be summarised as follows.
First, observing the control equations describing the evolution of the two
R&D e¤orts over time, it can be established that a larger demand size exerts
a negative e¤ect on both innovation rates at any time. Second, we nd that,
at any time, the two innovation e¤orts are independent of each other, due
to the assumption of full market coverage. This is in striking contrast to the
extant literature on R&D portfolios, where either complementarity or substi-
tutability between product innovation and cost reduction usually arises. The
simultaneous presence of product and process innovations and their relation
to product life cycle in monopoly and oligopoly models is in [16, 17], using the
representative consumer approach as in [23], which generates a price-elastic
market demand. In these models, product and process R&D e¤orts may
be either complements or substitutes and their relative intensity depends on
initial conditions and demand parameters. Third, we prove that there exists
a multiplicity of steady state points, among which a unique stable equilib-
rium can be singled out, this being a saddle point solution. The stability
analysis is carried on a Jacobian matrix which is a block diagonal one, the
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latter property being due to the aforementioned fact that the two dimensions
of innovation are independent of each other. Fourth, the welfare assessment
reveals that the prot-maximising monopolist disorts quality downwards as
compared to the social optimum, while producing the socially e¢ cient e¤ort
along the process innovation dimension.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup in in
Section. The equilibrium analysis is in Section 3, while Section 4 contains
the stability analysis. Section 5 examines the welfare implications.
2 The model
Our model is a variation on the setup introduced by [9] and [21]. We assume
the market is supplied by a single-product monopoly selling a nondurable
good of quality q (t) > 0 at price p (t) > 0 over continuous time t 2 [0;1) :
The population of consumers is characterised by a level of marginal willing-
ness to pay for quality  2 [  1;] ; where  > 1, and is distributed with
a uniform density d over such interval. Hence, the total mass of consumers
amounts to d  1. Parameter  can be interpreted as a proxy of income
or wealth. A similar although not entirely equivalent and less frequent ap-
proach consists in modelling consumer preferences by describing explicitly
their income distribution (see [22], inter alia). At any time t 2 [0;1) ; full
market coverage is assumed. Full market coverage may be interpreted as
describing a situation in which demand size is known a priori because under
full information the rm may identify at the outset the position   of the
marginal consumer. Here, for simplicity and through an appropriate choice
of measure,  = 1. Each individual buys a single unit of the good, whereby
his net surplus is
U = q (t)  p (t)  0: (1)
Production takes place at marginal cost c (t), which can be decreased (gener-
ating thus what is usually dened as process innovation) via an R&D e¤ort
y (t) : The monopolist also invests in product innovation (or quality improve-
ment) via the e¤ort k (t) ; to increase q (t). We assume the entire R&D
activity is carried out in house by the integrated rm. For an assessment
of the bearings of outsourcing on quality improvement, and the related con-
tractual design, see [6] and [7]. The total cost function borne by the rm
is
C (t) = c (t)x (t) + bk2 (t) + sy2 (t) + vq2 (t) (2)
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where x (t) is output, while b; s and v are positive parameters. The term
vq2 (t) in (2) measures the instantaneous cost of producing a quality level
q (t) using machinery and/or skilled labour operating at decreasing returns.
The state dynamics describing the evolution of c (t) and q (t) over time are
dq (t)
dt
 q = [k (t)  ] q (t) (3)
dc (t)
dt
 c =   [y (t)  ] c (t) (4)
in which  > 0 is the decay rate of quality while  > 0 is the obsolescence rate
a¤ecting production technology. We are supposing that R&D has an imme-
diate impact, which is admittedly a simplifying and unrealistic assumption
which, however, is commonly adopted. The presence of a decay rate in both
state equations can be interpreted as the e¤ect of tecnhological obsolescence
prevailing over learning-by-doing along both dimensions, although these two
elements are not endogenously modelled. An alternative interpretation con-
sists in thinking of the system of state dynamics (3-4) as perceived from
the standpoint of consumers: if the rm were not investing in R&D in ei-
ther direction or both, a consumer could think of the product as one which
incorporates an old and therefore inferior technology or know-how.
Under full market coverage, x (t) = d and the prot-maximising price
extracts the entire surplus from the pockets of the poorest consumer, i.e., it
is pm (t) = (  1) q (t) ; with superscript m standing for monopoly (cf. [12],
p. 113). The monopolists instantaneous prots are
 (t) = [(  1) q (t)  c (t)] d  bk2 (t)  sy2 (t)  vq2 (t) (5)




 (t) e tdt (6)
w.r.t. controls k (t) and y (t) ; under the constraints posed by the state equa-
tions (3-4), initial conditions q (0) = q0 > 0; c (0) = c0 2 (0; (  1) q (0)) ;
and the appropriate transversality conditions to be specied below. It is
worth observing that the initial condition on marginal cost says that it must
be strictly lower than the spending capability of the poorest consumer exist-
ing in this market, in order for full market coverage to hold at t = 0. Prots
are discounted at the constant rate  > 0.
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3 Equilibrium analysis










where  = et and  =  et are the costate variables (evaluated at time t)
associated with q and c, respectively. Henceforth, we shall omit the explicit
indication of the time argument for the sake of brevity. The resulting rst
order conditions (FOCs) on controls and costate equations are (exponential
discounting is omitted for brevity):
@H
@k
=  2bk + q = 0 (8)
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 = (   + y)+ d:
The accompanying set of transversality conditions is limt!1 qe t = 0 and
limt!1 ce
 t = 0.






























which, using (8-9) and (12), can be rewritten as follows:






y = y   cd
2s
(15)
The system composed by (3-4) and (14-15) identies the state-control system
of the dynamic problem at hand. In particular, the above control equations
show that the instantaneous R&D rates in both directions is decreasing in
the density parameter d. Given that d in this model also measures the total
mass of consumers, we may formulate:
Lemma 1 The instantaneous investment rates in product and process inno-
vation are inversely related to the size of demand.
The above Lemma captures a perverse e¤ect of mass consumption on
technical progress which is often conrmed by casual observation, namely,
that expanding demand jeopardises a rms incentives to increase the built-in
quality or technological content of a given product. The reason can be found
in the fact that a larger demand basin ensures at no cost higher revenues
which should otherwise be generated through costly investments.







which produces the following
Lemma 2 At any time t, the two R&D e¤orts are independent of each other.
This result contradicts a strand of theoretical research illustrating the
presence of either complementarity or substitutability between the two forms
of innovation both in optimal control models describing a monopolists prob-
lem (see [16]) and in di¤erential oligopoly games (see [17]). For more on the
emergence of complementarity or substitutability between process and prod-
uct innovation, see [1], [5], [13], [14] and [19]. The crucial di¤erence between
these models and the present one is that here demand is given and insensitive
to the price level, while in the remainder of the literature on the same issue
demand is a function of price. Hence, it seems that inelastic demand can be
held responsible of the independence of R&D e¤orts in the rms portfolio.
That is, when the total number of consumers queueing in front of its outlet
is xed and does not react to any increase in quality or decrease in cost, the
monopolists innovation decision along either dimension is solely driven by
time discounting and demand and cost parameters.
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Requiring that states be time-invariant and then solving the system made
up by (3-4) and (14-15) delivers the following set of solutions, where subscript
SS stands for steady state:
cSS = qSS = kSS = ySS = 0 (17)




d2 (  1)2   16bv
4v
(18)
cSS = ySS = 0; kSS = ;
qSS =
d (  1) +
q




















; ySS = ; kSS = ;
qSS =
d (  1) +
q
d2 (  1)2   16bv
4v
(22)










must be satised in order for qSS to be real. If so, then it is easy to check
that qSS is also positive. The stability properties are investigated in the next
Section.
4 Stability analysis
The stability properties of the dynamic model can be assessed looking at the
Jacobian matrix of the state-control system made up by (3-4) and (14-15),
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which is a block diagonal matrix, as a result of the fact that (i) the sub-
system (3-14) is independent of c and y and, similarly, (ii) the system (4-15)
is independent of q and k. Hence, each 2  2 sub-matrix along the main
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Points (17-20) can be disregarded as they are not economically sensible,
and it can also be shown that they are unstable along at least one dimension.
We are left with (21) and (22). In (21), we have
T (Jc;y) = ;  (Jc;y) =   (27)













which reveals that the dimension of product quality is a¤ected by instability.
Finally, in (22), we have
T (Jc;y) = ;  (Jc;y) =   (29)












in which both determinants are negative. Accordingly, we may formulate:








the dynamic monopoly model with a bidimensional R&D portfolio produces a








d (  1) +
q
d2 (  1)2   16bv
4v
5 Welfare appraisal
To complement the analysis, one can look at the welfare consequences of the
rms R&D decisions. In the remainder of the analysis illustrated in this
Section, we will examine a situation in which, under the monopoly pricing
rule pm = (  1) q, a benevolent social planner is in charge of choosing
the investment path for process and product innovation to maximise the
intertemporal ow of social welfare discounted at the same rate  used by
the monopolist. This approach to the assessment of the (in)e¢ ciency of the
monopolists R&D choices is in line with the original appraisal of quality
supply in monopoly in a static model in [24].








measuring consumer surplus. Since instantaneous prots are (5), the social
welfare function is
SW =
q [1 + 2d (  1)  2vq]
2
  cd  bk2   sy2 (32)










where the superscript sp mnemonics for social planning. The FOCs on R&D
controls k and y coincide with (8-9), and the costate equation concerning the
dynamics of  is the same as in (11). However, the presence of consumer sur-
plus in the instantaneous payo¤ entails that the remaining costate equation
is indeed di¤erent from (10):

sp = ( +   k)sp   d (  1) + 2vq   1
2
(34)
As a result, the planners control equations are





ysp = ysp   cd
2s
(36)
The above system reveals that the planners incentive to abate marginal
production cost c is indeed the same as the prot-maximising monopolists
(and therefore the investment in process innovation by the latter is socially
e¢ cient), while imposing stationarity on (35) delivers
kspSS =
[1 + 2d (  1)  4vqSS] qSS
4b
(37)
which can be compared with the monopoly solution attained by imposing
stationarity on (14):
kmSS =
[(  1) d  2vqSS] qSS
2b
(38)
The di¤erence between kspSS and k
m
SS is





for any qSS > 0; in particular at the quality level qmSS reached by the mo-
nopolist in the steady state driven by prot incentives only. An analogous
exercise can be executed imposing k = kspSS and q = q
m
SS and then observing











which lends itself to the same interpretation. This translates into the follow-
ing:
Proposition 4 Given the monopoly pricing rule, prot incentives cause a
downward distortion of the steady state quality level. Process innovation
incentives are instead the same under both regimes.
The driving force of quality undersupply at the monopoly equilibrium has
to be identied in the absence of consumer surplus in the rms objective:
a benevolent social planner would welcome any increase in q to benet con-
sumers, given the monopoly price and the corresponding (socially e¢ cient)
amount of cost-reducing R&D chosen by the rm. This amounts to saying
that, at the monopoly optimum, consumer surplus is still increasing in prod-
uct quality. This reproduces in a dynamic setup a result dating back to [21]
and [24]. Conversely, process innovation is socially e¢ cient: this depends on
the fact that pm is not a function of marginal cost and market demand is not
sensitive to any decrease in the latter. As a result, underinvesting in process
innovation would simply cause a decrease in prots (gross of all xed costs).
For this reason, it is in the best interest of the prot-maximising monopolist
not to distort this dimension of its investment portfolio.
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